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Trial and Heirs
ANTEMORTEM PROBATE FOR THE CHANGING
AMERICAN FAMILY
“It has been said . . . that a will is more apt to be the
subject of litigation than any other legal instrument. To say the
least, it is an instrument frequently made the subject of litigation.
Usually it is the most important document executed in a person’s
lifetime. This immediately suggests that a will representing the
true wishes of a testator of sound mind should be so prepared and
executed as to be invulnerable, if possible, to an improper attack.”1
INTRODUCTION
The Pritchett-Dunphy-Tucker family2 has brought the
diversity of today’s modern American family center stage and has
replaced the Bradys of the 1970s3 and the Cleavers of the 1950s.4
The notion of the traditional American family has changed
dramatically due to the rise in divorce rates and remarriages, the
growing popularity of cohabitating, and the increased acceptance
of same-sex couples. Andrew J. Cherlin, a professor of public
policy at Johns Hopkins University, acknowledged that “[the]
turnover in our intimate partnerships is creating complex
families on a scale we’ve not seen before,” and although families
have undergone an enormous change, our society is very much
still in the midst of a transformation.5 But the law of succession
1 Leon Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 87, 88 (1958).
2 About Modern Family, ABC, http://abc.go.com/shows/modern-family/about-the-
show [http://perma.cc/KVR8-7RZS] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (a television sitcom depicting a
large and blended family that is “cementing itself as a culturally defining series”).
3 The Brady Bunch (TV Series 1969–1974)—Plot Summary, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0063878/plotsummary?ref_=tt_stry_pl [http://perma.cc/Y3ZU-
CUB9] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (a classic comedy depicting a large blended family that
must adapt to new stepparents, stepchildren, and stepsiblings).
4 Leave It to Beaver (TV Series 1957–1963)—Plot Summary, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0050032/plotsummary?ref_=tt_stry_pl [http://perma.cc/3CZF-
3A24] (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (a family sitcom depicting an “All-American Family” in
the 1950s).
5 Natalie Angier, The Changing American Family, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/health/families.html [http://perma.cc/L3MF-7HTR].
780 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2
has failed to keep pace with the emergent population of
nontraditional families.
Freedom of disposition is a longstanding tenant of
property law and inheritance law.
American society has long recognized the value inherent in protecting
an individual’s ability to acquire and transfer private property.
Testamentary freedom is derived from this well-established property
law right and is accordingly the governing principle underlying American
succession law. Just as individuals have the right to accumulate,
consume, and transfer personal property during life, individuals
generally are, and should be, free to control the disposition of personal
property at death. Thus, testamentary freedom can be viewed simply as
one stick in the bundle of rights referred to as property rights.6
Freedom of disposition has always been important but is even more
so in light of the changing American family. Intestacy statutes are
antiquated and leave the right to freedom of disposition uncertain
and vulnerable for a vast population. Antemortem probate is one
technique that states can employ to protect freedom of disposition
for members of nontraditional families.
A will is a legal document in which an individual
expresses wishes for the disposition of his or her property after
death.7 A testator8 will typically work with an attorney to draft a
will that clearly and explicitly lays out those wishes. These efforts
represent the testator’s intent, which is the directing principle
and must prevail.9 Thus, a court’s preference is that property be
disposed of in accordance with a decedent’s desires as expressed
in a valid will. Despite these efforts, however, many wills are
frequently contested under theories of “undue influence,
testamentary [mental] [in]capacity, and fraud.”10 As a result,
6 Irene D. Johnson, There’s a Will, but No Way—Whatever Happened to the
Doctrine of Testamentary Freedom and What Can (Should) We Do to Restore It?, 4 EST.
PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 105, 105 n.1 (2011) (citing Lee-Ford Tritt, Technical
Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform
Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 280-81 (2010)).
7 Will, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8 A testator is a person who has made a will. Testator, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
9 In re Estate of Burleigh, 175 A.2d 838, 839 (Pa. 1961).
10 Margaret Ryznar & Angelique Devaux, Au Revoir, Will Contests: Comparative
Lessons for Preventing Will Contests, 14 NEV. L.J. 1, 1, 3 (2013). Additionally, about half of
the states recognize a new tort called “tortious interference with an expectancy.” See JESSE
DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 320 (9th ed. 2013). This
new tort is not a challenge to the will but instead permits recovery for a wrongful
interference when it occurs in conjunction with an expectation of inheritance. Id. at 324-25.
Professor Robert H. Sitkoff finds this new tort troublesome because it “recognizes a primary
right in a prospective donee to inherit, [and] it is in deep tension with the principle of
freedom of disposition.” Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS L.J. 643, 650 (2014). For more on the critique of this new tort, see
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there is no guarantee that a court will uphold an executed will.
This presents a major conflict in probate law because courts are
unable to honor a testator’s intent in the face of will contests
brought by relatives or friends who believe that they are entitled
to more than the will designates.
The probate system is the judicial process by which a
testator’s will is admitted to a court for proof of validity upon the
testator’s death.11 In an attempt to prevent postmortem will
contests, a handful of states have passed legislation permitting
antemortem probate.12 Unlike postmortem probate, antemortem
probate would allow for the probate of a testator’s will before the
testator’s death.13 The most recent state to adopt antemortem
probate is New Hampshire, which signed into law an antemortem
probate statute on July 11, 2014.14
In light of the American family’s changing dynamics, this
note first explores how inheritance law could benefit from an
antemortem probate statute that would protect a growing
population of Americans. It then encourages the drafters of the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) to adopt antemortem probate
procedures. Part I of this note considers the American family’s
changing structure and explains how current inheritance laws do
not protect the changing American family. Part II discusses the
background of antemortem probate, including its history and the
proposed models for an antemortem statute. This part also
describes the antemortem statutes currently in effect in five
states and the arguments for and against the antemortem
measure. Part III proposes implementing an antemortem probate
statute that incorporates aspects of current state statutes and the
Administrative Model (which proposes that a state implement an
ex parte proceeding in which a decisionmaker considers the
testator and the testator’s particular factual circumstances in
John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful
Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335 (2013).
11 Probate, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
12 Antemortem probate is also known as predeath, premortem, or living probate.
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (West
2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (West 2015); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.530 (2015); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18 (2015).
13 Antemortem Probate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Interestingly, the 9th edition, published in 2009, did not include a definition of
antemortem probate. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
14 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18; see also Paul Briand, New Granite State
Estate Law Designed to End Shenanigans, SEACOAST ONLINE (Aug. 25, 2014, 2:00
AM), http://seacoastonline.com/articles/20140825-NEWS-408250321 [http://perma.cc/7YMB-
5RVW]; Amy Kanyuk, New Hampshire Amends Its Trust Laws, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM
(Sept. 5, 2014), http://wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/new-hampshire-amends-its-
trust-laws [http://perma.cc/FUW4-URE5].
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order to determine a will’s validity). Lastly, Part IV proposes a
statute that the drafters of the UPC could adopt.
I. THE AMERICAN FAMILY
When a person dies without a will, intestacy statutes
provide a distribution scheme for the decedent’s estate based on a
presumed donative intent, but these intestacy statutes are
outdated given the evolving American family. U.S. Census Bureau
data demonstrates the increased number of nontraditional
families. It also shows the complexity of family relationships, which
can make it difficult to apply intestacy statutes to a nontraditional
family. Because the inheritance rights of a nontraditional family
member are vulnerable, the law should protect these individuals
when a testator prepares a will as a means of circumventing the
intestacy statutes. Antemortem probate is one viable solution to
address the shortcomings of intestacy statutes as applied to the
nontraditional family.
A. The Changing American Family
A traditional or nuclear family can be defined as one that
includes a husband and a wife and their combined genetic
children who were not conceived by means of reproductive
technology.15 Modern attitudes are also likely to consider adopted
children as part of the traditional family, which is reflected in
state probate laws that provide for a legal adoption to be the
equivalent of a blood relationship.16 In contrast, a nontraditional
family encompasses all other familial structures, brought about
through divorce and remarriage, and includes stepchildren,
cohabitating couples and their children, and same-sex couples and
their children. The nontraditional family is a rapidly growing
trend, and, in fact, nontraditional families now outnumber
traditional families. Based on U.S. Census Bureau data, in 2010,
only 48% of American households were comprised of traditional
families, a number which fell from 52% in 2000, 55% in 1990, and
78% in 1950.17
15 RALPHC.BRASHIER, INHERITANCELAWANDTHEEVOLVINGFAMILY 3 (2004).
16 Id. at 5; see N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 1-2.10(a)(2), 4-1.1(d)
(McKinney 2015); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(c) (McKinney 2015).
17 DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND
FAMILIES: 2010, at 5-6 (2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HA44-U9KP]; David Port, Estate Planning for the Modern Family,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2014/09/25/estate-planning-
for-the-modern-family [http://perma.cc/2UTN-AVXE].
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In 2010, 16.3 million Americans lived in unmarried
cohabitating households.18 The number of opposite-sex cohabitating
households increased by 40% from 2000 to 2010.19 The number of
same-sex cohabitating households increased by 80% from 2000 to
2010.20 In fact, 2010 marks the first time that husband-wife
households made up less than 50% of all households in the United
States.21 Additionally, one in five children is now born into an
unmarried cohabitating household, and two in five are likely to live
in an unmarried cohabitating household by the age of 12.22 The
National Survey of Family Growth found that between 2006 and
2010, almost half (48%) of 15- to 44-year-old women had
cohabitated prior to marriage.23 The researchers concluded that
cohabitation has become the first union formed among young
adults in the United States and that cohabitation has led to the
delay in first marriages for this population.24
In addition to changes in cohabitating households, the
stability and longevity of marriages have eroded in recent
decades. Today, around 50% of first marriages end in divorce,25
which makes each nuptial feel like a proverbial coin flip. In
fact, the national marriage and divorce rate between 2000 and
2011 consistently hovered around 50%, and in 2011, the divorce
rate surpassed the 50% mark.26 One study estimating the
national average length of first and second marriages for
women ages 15-44 found that one-fifth (20%) of first marriages
18 Rose M. Kreider, U.S. Census Bureau, Increase in Opposite-Sex
Cohabitating Couples from 2009 to 2010 in the Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (ASEC) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) tbl.1 (Sept. 15, 2010)
(unnumbered working paper), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/Inc-
Opp-sex-2009-to-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/8KB7-MCSH] (2010 data shows 7,529,000
opposite-sex couples and 620,000 same-sex couples living in cohabitation).
19 LOFQUIST ET AL., supra note 17, at 6.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 5.
22 ROSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2009, at 8 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/
p70-126.pdf [http://perma.cc/53SS-4G9U].
23 Casey E. Copen et al., First Premarital Cohabitation in the United States:
2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP., Apr. 4, 2013,
at 1, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf [http://perma.cc/T5ZB-QX2N].
24 Casey E. Copen et al., First Marriages in the United States: Data from the
2006–2010 National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP., Mar. 22, 2012, at
2, 9, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf [http://perma.cc/HGD8-CJBR]; see also
Angier, supra note 5 (“For many cohabitating couples, there’s a high bar for marriage, high
expectations of where they should be at economically or emotionally, and if they don’t meet
that bar they’ll put off getting married.” (quoting Professor Kelly Musick’s explanation of
why cohabitation contributes to the delay in marriage)).
25 Copen et al., supra note 24, at 1.
26 National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CTRS. FORDISEASECONTROL AND
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm [http://perma.cc/
3HT8-N98R] (last updated Feb. 19, 2013) (2011 marriage rate per 1,000 people of 6.8%
compared with the 2011 divorce rate per 1,000 people of 3.6%).
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ended within 5 years and one-third (33%) ended within 10
years.27 The same study found that within 10 years, 75% of
divorced women remarried.28 Additionally, after 10 years of
remarriage, 47% of remarriages dissolved for women under age
25 at the time of remarriage, and 34% of remarriages dissolved
for women age 25 or older at the time of remarriage.29 The
study also compared its findings with the probability of
marriage dissolution in 1973 and ultimately concluded that
divorce is “more likely now than in the past for both first and
second marriages.”30 Additionally, according to a 2014 Pew
Research Center report, 40% of all new marriages in the
United States are remarriages for one or both of the partners.31
Given the current divorce rate and the likelihood of
remarriage, stepfamilies are inevitable. Yet data for stepfamilies
and stepchildren is tough to capture. First, the 2000 Census was
the first to gather data on the type of relationship between the
household parent32 and child to determine whether the child was
biological, step, or adopted.33 Second, the U.S. Census surveys
home addresses to determine who lives in each household, and
relationships that cross household boundaries are not accounted
for, such as those with children who have stepparents that live at
another address.34 Additionally, the term “step” has broadened to
encompass relationships formed outside of marriage and includes
cohabitating families.35 For example, one member of an
unmarried couple might identify their partner’s biological child as
their stepchild. This more recent definition also exemplifies how
27 Matthew D. Bramlett et al., First Marriage Dissolution, Divorce, and
Remarriage: United States, ADVANCE DATA, May 31, 2001, at 1, 5, http://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/ad/ad323.pdf [http://perma.cc/E9LN-LG3G].
28 Id. at 9.
29 Id. at 11.
30 Id. at 12.
31 Gretchen Livingston, Four-in-Ten Couples Are Saying “I Do,” Again, PEW RES.
CTR. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/11/14/four-in-ten-couples-are-saying
-i-do-again/ [https://perma.cc/9XPZ-EGU8]; see also Elizabeth Bernstein, How Long Does it
Take to Unite a Stepfamily?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2016, 3:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-long-does-it-take-for-a-stepfamily-to-gel-1453754797 [https://perma.cc/3S5K-S4
LM] (discussing the rise in remarriage rates and the stages of blending a family).
32 The term “household parent” refers to the person whose name is on the lease or
mortgage. The data collected is based on household address and the relationship between
children and their coresident parents, thus the data does not take into account relationships
between people who do not live in the same household. ROSE M. KREIDER & DAPHNE A.
LOFQUIST, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN: 2010, at 1 &
nn.2, 4 (2014), http://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-572.pdf [http://perma.cc/9N46-
U7YZ].
33 Id. at 4.
34 Id. at 3.
35 Id. at 17, 19.
2016] TRIAL AND HEIRS 785
the American family is now defined by functional relationships,
rather than formal relationships formed by marriage or blood.
Nevertheless, data collected from the 2010 Census, the
2009–2011 American Community Surveys, and the 2012 Current
Population Survey show that nationally in 2010, 4.3% of children
under age 18 were stepchildren.36 Data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation shows that 5.6 million children under
the age of 18 lived with at least one stepparent in 2009.37 In 2009,
out of 50.8 million children living with two parents, 10% lived
with a biological parent and a stepparent, and approximately one
in eight children living with two parents lived with a stepparent
or adoptive parent.38 And in 2010, 11% of children who lived with
one biological or adoptive parent who cohabitated with a partner
(who was not the child’s other biological or adoptive parent)
recognized the cohabitating partner as a stepparent.39 Adding to
the complexity of stepfamily data is the fact that most children in
stepfamilies—about 85%—have siblings.40 Out of 57.7 million
children who lived with siblings in 2009, 11% lived with at least
one half-sibling (sharing one biological parent), 2% lived with at
least one stepsibling (no common biological parent), and 2% lived
with at least one adopted sibling.41
Although recognition of same-sex families has increased in
American culture, capturing data on same-sex families has been
neither quick nor accurate.42 First, the Census Bureau began
collecting data on same-sex households when it added the
category of “unmarried partner” to the 1990 Census.43 But this
category clearly captures any unmarried couple, whether same-
sex or not. Second, the 2010 Census provided the first reports on
same-sex married couples.44 In the 2000 Census, same-sex couples
were counted as unmarried couples because at the time, no state
had legalized same-sex marriage.45 The Census Bureau continues
to work on improving the measurement of same-sex relationships.
36 Id. at 1, 3, 7.
37 KREIDER&ELLIS, supra note 22, at 1, 6.
38 Id. at 7.
39 KREIDER& LOFQUIST, supra note 32, at 21, 31.
40 Id. at 22.
41 KREIDER&ELLIS, supra note 22, at 14, 17.
42 For a more in-depth analysis of how same-sex couple relationships are
misreported, see Jamie M. Lewis et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Measuring Same-Sex
Couples: The What and Who of Misreporting on Relationship and Sex (May 2015)
(unnumbered working paper), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
working-papers/2015/demo/SEHSD-WP2015-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/KKL2-SQMP].
43 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SAME-SEX
COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2013), http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/SScplfactsheet_
final.pdf [http://perma.cc/8XH8-QG2C].
44 Id.
45 Id.
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Primarily, this entails modifying the relationship question, which
“measures the changing composition of families and households in
the United States.”46 In 2010, the Census Bureau organized focus
groups and cognitive interviews in order to learn how participants
perceived the relationship question.47 Based on the information
collected, the Census Bureau developed revised answer choices for
the relationship question, along with two additional follow-up
questions related to the marital status question.48 It is currently
testing the revised relationship questions in several surveys, and
it also plans to implement these new relationship questions in the
2020 Census.49 Additionally, in 2005, the Census Bureau started
compiling yearly estimates of the number of same-sex married
households using data from the American Community Survey
(ACS).50 This process of modification reflects how the American
family is changing and what is being done to accurately measure
the composition of today’s American family.
Despite the limited data, the ACS data on same-sex couple
households found that in 2010, there were about 594,000 same-
sex couples living in the United States, making up about 1% of all
couple households.51 Of those households, 152,000 (25.7%)
reported that they were spouses and 115,000 reported having
children (biological, step, or adopted).52 In the 2011 ACS, 605,472
households reported containing same-sex couples.53 Of those
households, 168,092 (27.8%) reported that the couples were
spouses, and 16% reported that they had children (biological, step,
46 LOFQUIST ET AL., supra note 17, at 21; FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS, supra note 43, at 3-4 (the modified relationship
question will contain separate categories for opposite sex spouses and same-sex spouses
or partners, and it will contain follow-up questions to account for cohabitation, domestic
partnerships, and civil unions).
47 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS,
supra note 43, at 3-4. The primary findings of this work revealed that (1) respondents
wanted “categories to reflect legal unions for same-sex couples,” (2) respondents wanted
to “move the unmarried partner category next to spouse in the list,” and (3) some people
interpreted the term “partner” to apply only to same-sex relationships, whereas some
people in unmarried opposite-sex relationships were comfortable selecting the “unmarried
partner” category. Id. at 4.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1.
51 DAPHNE LOFQUIST, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS 1
(2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-03.pdf [http://perma.cc/8JUV-KRZ5];
see also Same-Sex Couple Households: 2010 American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU tbl.3, http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html [http://perma.cc/75X9-XL
52] (follow “2010” hyperlink under “Characteristics of Same-Sex Couple Households”) (last
visited Mar. 8, 2016).
52 LOFQUIST, supra note 51, at 2.
53 FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS,
supra note 43, at 1.
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or adopted).54 The 2012 ACS data showed 639,440 same-sex
couple households, of which 28.5% reported that the couples were
spouses.55 And 34.6 % of the 726,000 same-sex household couples
identified in the 2013 ACS reported that they were spouses.56 In
the 2014 ACS, 783,100 same-sex couple households were
reported, of which 42.8% of the couples reported that they were
spouses.57 Even from this imperfect data, it is apparent that the
number of reported same-sex households is increasing year after
year, and the number of married same-sex couples is likely to rise
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges in
which the Court ruled that same-sex couples nationwide have a
constitutional right to marry.58
Overall, this data supports the general perception that the
structure of the American family has changed from the
traditional nuclear family and will continue to change in the
future. In light of this, states need to revisit their inheritance
laws to better protect the nontraditional family member’s right to
freedom of disposition.
B. The Changing American Family and Intestacy
Despite the changing landscape of American households,
modern inheritance laws have yet to provide for the treatment of
these nontraditional families via default intestacy rules.59 When a
54 Id. at 1, 3; Tables 2 & 3: Same Sex Couple Households: 2011 American
Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/
acs.html [http://perma.cc/24XT-SG65] (follow “2011” hyperlink under “Characteristics of
Same-Sex Couples”) (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
55 Table 3: Same-Sex Couple Households: 2012 American Community Survey,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html [http://perma.cc/
7DN6-5BWH] (follow “2012” hyperlink under “Characteristics of Same-Sex Couple
Households”) (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
56 Table 3: Same-Sex Couple Households: 2013 American Community Survey,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html [http://perma.cc/
B9RL-USN5] (follow “2013” hyperlink under “Characteristics of Same-Sex Couple
Households”) (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
57 Table 3: Same-Sex Couple Households: 2014 American Community Survey,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/data/acs.html [http://perma.cc/
X6JL-V257] (follow “2014” hyperlink under “Characteristics of Same-Sex Couple
Households”) (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
58 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
59 For further discussion of nontraditional families and current intestacy laws,
see Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition of Family: A Proposal for Guided Discretion in
Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787 (2012) (proposing an intestacy statute that permits
judicial discretion within a statutory framework to better serve current family
circumstances); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of
Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877 (2012) (proposing a solution to the high rate of intestacy by
attaching an optional form will to state income tax returns); Peter J. Harrington, Untying
the Knot: Extending Intestacy Benefits to Non-Traditional Families by Severing the Link to
Marriage, 25 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 323, 327 (2011) (arguing for the addition of
“committed partner” to the intestacy statute due to the nature of today’s family structure);
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decedent does not use a will to dispose of property, the property
passes via intestacy.60 A 2014 survey found that 64% of
Americans have not executed a will, and 55% of Americans with
children also have no will in place.61 Thus, for many Americans,
the intestacy default rules will provide the disposition scheme for
their property upon death.
Most states adopt their own intestacy statutes rather than
follow the UPC, but overall, in most states an intestate estate is
distributed to heirs in the following order: surviving spouse,
descendants, parents, descendants of parents, grandparents, and
descendants of grandparents.62 This statutory scheme reflects a
presumption that most individuals prefer property to pass to
surviving family members by marriage or blood. After all,
intestacy statutes are primarily aimed at carrying out a
decedent’s presumed intent by approximating how a typical
individual would have distributed property during life.63 This
presumption is quite disadvantageous and unsuitable for
members of nontraditional families, however, because those
families may not fit the formal definition of family and may
include functional relationships outside of marriage and blood
lineage. Because the intestacy statutes exclude family members
to whom a decedent may have preferred to leave property, the
statutes fall short of their primary goal for a growing population
of Americans—to carry out a decedent’s intent.
A secondary goal of intestacy laws is to create a
distribution system that is administratively feasible and “clear,
fair, and simple.”64 The current intestacy laws create a bright-line
rule that makes it easy to delineate who is included or excluded
from inheritance. Given the complexity of the American family
structure, the many and potentially endless lists of functional
family relationships to consider, and the likely variations of a
decedent’s wishes, changes to the intestacy statutes seem futile
Terin Barbas Cremer, Reforming Intestate Inheritance for Stepchildren and Stepparents, 18
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 89 (2011) (proposing a statute consisting of factors to better suit
blended families due to the shortcomings of intestacy statutes); Thomas P. Gallanis, The
Flexible Family in Three Dimension, 28 L. & INEQ. 291 (2010) (asserting that the law should
recognize and protect different kinds of families and focusing primarily on cohabitating
couples); Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199
(2001) (arguing that inheritance law has failed to adapt to modern American society and
providing three possible reforms).
60 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
61 Rocket Lawyer Delivers No Excuses Estate Planning for April “Make-A-Will
Month,” ROCKET LAW. NEWS (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.rocketlawyer.com/news/article-
Make-a-Will-Month-2014.aspx [https://perma.cc/5EFV-25AZ].
62 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, 2-103 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010);
N.Y. EST. POWERS& TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2015).
63 Harrington, supra note 59, at 330-31.
64 See Gary, supra note 59, at 9; Harrington, supra note 59, at 332.
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and next to impossible. Moreover, because the state legislature is
responsible for adopting intestacy statutes, it would prove difficult
for any legislature to come to a consensus on which nontraditional
relationships should be recognized in intestacy without employing
some sort of arbitrary line drawing that risks perpetuating the idea
of an “accepted” or “proper” definition of family. Thus, altering the
intestacy statutes may not be a viable or workable solution.
But the same laws permitting intestacy also permit
members of nontraditional families to execute a will and take
affirmative steps in directing the passage of property at death.65
When testators in nontraditional families turn to will planning to
effectuate their wishes and carry out their right to freedom of
disposition, intestacy rules become irrelevant. So the natural
argument is that the opportunity to execute a will reduces the ill
effects of excluding the nontraditional family population from the
intestacy default rules. However, considering that in the majority
of states a will is validated in a postmortem probate process,
should the will of a testator in a nontraditional family be deemed
invalid following death, the testator’s wishes and intent will not
be executed as planned. Instead, the state intestacy default laws,
which fail to include nontraditional families or keep pace with the
changing landscape of the American family, will govern the
distribution of a testator’s property.
Nevertheless, the common (and possibly best) solution
available to nontraditional family members is to execute a will.66
And if estate planning is the favored solution for this population,
it makes the need for ensuring that a will stands after a
decedent’s death all the more important. With so many
individuals in nontraditional family structures potentially
turning to will planning67 to ensure that their intent is provided
for, the law needs to ensure that wills are given their rightful
legal certainty in order to prevent an increase in will contests.
Thus, antemortem probate can create the legal certainty that a
nontraditional family member may seek when planning for the
65 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
66 See, e.g., Gary, supra note 59, at 811 (“One solution is for more people to
execute wills.”); Weisbord, supra note 59, at 891 n.66 (“[T]he best way to facilitate
testamentary intent for . . . [nontraditional families] is to promote testacy rather than
alter the rules of intestate distribution.”). See generally Kristine S. Knaplund,
Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the Implications for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1 (2006) (discussing the application of intestacy statutes to grandparents raising
grandchildren and arguing that the simplest and best solution to avoid intestacy rules
is for grandparents to write a will).
67 A will is not the only form of estate planning that nontraditional family
members can utilize. There are forms of nonprobate transfers such as trusts, which are
still susceptible to similar challenges but may be more difficult to oppose. This note
focuses, however, on testamentary will planning.
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disposition of property upon death. This population is the most
likely to take advantage of antemortem probate because it will
keep those who are unaware or unaccepting of an individual’s
lifestyle at bay, and the procedure should give nontraditional
family members satisfaction and confidence that their wishes will
be respected. For this population, the expense is also likely worth
the inevitable hassle an individual foresees based on their
nontraditional family structure.
Essentially, there is a gap in how the inheritance laws will
protect the evolving family structure in America that needs to be
addressed, and one solution that can help fill that gap is
antemortem probate. Part II examines the history of antemortem
probate statutes and explores several models that could serve as a
foundation for adopting an antemortem probate option.
II. ANTEMORTEM PROBATE: HISTORY ANDMODELS
Antemortem probate is a concept that has been
contemplated by the courts, legal scholars, and several states.
Such contemplation has led academics to develop three models
for developing an antemortem probate statute. Thus far, the
benefits of antemortem probate have persuaded five states to
adopt the measure.
A. History of Antemortem Probate
1. The Courts
The earliest example of antemortem probate legislation
appeared in 1883 when Michigan enacted a statute that allowed a
testator to present the probate judge with a will and obtain a
declaration of validity during the testator’s lifetime.68 In 1885,
however, in the case of Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, the
Michigan Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional on
two grounds: (1) it failed to provide a testator’s spouse and child
with notice and the opportunity to be heard; and (2) it failed to
provide for finality of judgment.69 The finality of judgment was an
issue because any determination of validity “will at all times be
subject to . . . [a testator’s] own discretion or caprice.”70 Because
the statute allowed a determination of validity but also allowed
the testator to retain the power to amend, revoke, or alter the
68 Act of April 11, 1883, No. 25, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 17 (providing for
antemortem probate).
69 Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 23 N.W. 28, 28-29 (Mich. 1885).
70 Id. at 29.
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will,71 any judgment of validity might never be final. The
Michigan Supreme Court also found that allowing this type of
determination would be akin to “issuing an advisory opinion
which was prohibited by Michigan’s constitution.”72 Justice
Campbell, in his concurring opinion, flatly rejected the notion of
antemortem probate for two reasons: (1) because of the well-
settled common law that the living have no heirs, and (2) because
judicial power is confined to controversies between interested
parties, which cannot exist between a living testator and her
potential heirs.73
Then, in 1916, the Washington Supreme Court was
confronted with the issue of will validation during the life of a
testator. Unlike in Lloyd, where a testator wanted to probate his
will while alive, in Pond v. Faust, an incapacitated testator’s
guardian brought an action to annul and cancel the testator’s will
because she was insane and incompetent when she executed her
will.74 Citing Lloyd, the Pond court dismissed the guardian’s
action based on the maxim that “[u]ntil a man dies he has no
heirs.”75 As in Lloyd, the Pond court also found that it had no
jurisdiction over wills aside from following a will’s directions,76 and
to validate a will during a testator’s lifetime would mean issuing a
declaratory judgment,77 which was prohibited at the time.78
The idea that courts could not issue declaratory
judgments came into question in 1937. The U.S. Supreme Court
permitted declaratory judgments in the case of Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Haworth, in which the Court upheld the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (FDJA).79 In so holding, the
Court noted that the FDJA was a procedural mechanism to deal
71 § 6, 1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 18.
72 Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable
Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131, 155 (1990); Lloyd, 23 N.W. at 29 (“[W]e know of no
authority for requiring the circuit court to take cognizance of appeals in cases not
properly judicial, and to give its time and attention to the making of order which are
not judgments, and which the party seeking and obtaining them is under no obligation
to leave in force for a day or an hour.”).
73 Lloyd, 23 N.W. at 30-31 (Campbell, J., concurring).
74 Pond v. Faust, 155 P. 776, 777 (Wash. 1916).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 778.
77 “A binding adjudication that establishes the rights and other legal relations of
the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement. Declaratory judgments are often
sought . . . by insurance companies in determining whether a policy covers a given insured
or peril.” Declaratory Judgment, BLACK’SLAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
78 Charles F. Gibbs & Brian Corrigan, Pre-Mortem Probate: Has the Time
Arrived?, TR. & EST., Aug. 2007, at 28, 30.
79 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (“The Declaratory
Judgment Act must be deemed to fall within this ambit of congressional power, so far as it
authorizes relief which is consonant with the exercise of the judicial function in the
determination of controversies to which under the Constitution the judicial power extends.”).
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with controversies in the constitutional sense.80 The Court laid
out the requirements for a controversy that is appropriate for a
judicial declaratory judgment:
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests . . . . It must be a
real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through
a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.81
Hence, the courts did not have to wait until a situation
transformed into a full-scale controversy before offering a
prompt solution.
Although Aetna Life Insurance Co. kept the door open for
antemortem declaratory judgments, other procedural hurdles
remained before antemortem probate could be solved with
declaratory judgments. Such hurdles included “1) the requirements
of ‘ripeness, sufficiency and adversity of the parties;’ 2) an actual
concrete controversy; and 3) finality of the judgment.”82 Some
states have bypassed these procedural hurdles by instituting
antemortem legislation, thus giving a court jurisdiction to
determine a will’s validity during the testator’s life.83
But in the meantime, in 1952, a Texas appellate court
struck down the idea of using antemortem probate declaratory
judgments.84 In Cowan v. Cowan, two adult children brought an
action to invalidate their incapacitated mother’s will because it
disinherited both of them and left the residuary estate to the
mother’s third adult child.85 The children sought a declaration
under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which
provided that “any person interested under a deed, will, or
written contract may have determined any question of validity
arising under the instrument.”86 Although the statutory language
appeared to authorize the court to make a determination of
validity, the Cowan court refused to make such a finding, stating
that because prior to the Act, no Texas court had the power to
determine the validity of a living testator’s will, no Texas court
had that power at the time of Cowan, either.87 That is, the court
would not read the Act as conferring the necessary authority to
80 Id.
81 Id. at 240-41.
82 Leopold & Beyer, supra note 72, at 156.
83 See infra Section II.C (discussing the antemortem statutes of North
Dakota, Ohio, Arkansas, Alaska, and New Hampshire).
84 Cowan v. Cowan, 254 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
85 Id. at 862-63.
86 Id. at 862.
87 Id. at 863.
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validate the will. The Act was not intended to (nor did it) create
any substantive rights, and it did not “contemplate declarations
upon matters where the interest of the plaintiff is contingent
upon the occurrence of some future event.”88 In the end, Cowan
echoed Lloyd and Pond in finding that until the mother’s death,
there would be no heirs, and the two adult children had no
interest in the mother’s will.89 Although Aetna Life Insurance Co.
seemingly kept the door open for premortem probate declaratory
judgments, some states have chosen to close that door, thus
leaving intact the procedural hurdle requiring a controversy.
2. Legal Scholarship and State Statutes
Outside of the courts, there is a history of legal scholars
pushing to include antemortem probate in legal doctrine. In the
1930s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws established a special committee to draft a uniform
act that would allow wills to be validated before a testator
passes away.90 Two methods were proposed: (1) allow a testator
to file the will with the court clerk for safe keeping, and (2)
provide for an antemortem probate proceeding.91 The proposal
was not approved, however, because at the time there were no
state laws on antemortem probate, and the Commissioners
were thus advocating for new legislation rather than for
unifying current legislation.92
In 1946, the Model Probate Code’s drafters considered
including an antemortem probate statute but ultimately
concluded that “[t]he practical advantages of such a device are not
great in view of the fact that few testators would wish to
encounter the publicity involved in such a proceeding.”93 Then, in
1967, the UPC’s drafters again considered inclusion of an
antemortem probate statute that would allow a testator to
petition the court for a declaratory judgment that a will is valid
subject only to the testator’s revocation.94 Commentary stated
that although the procedure may not be used often, it is
“recommended and of considerable attraction to the public”
88 Id. at 864-65.
89 Id. at 865; see also Gibbs & Corrigan, supra note 78, at 30.
90 Leopold & Beyer, supra note 72, at 161.
91 Id.
92 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONALCONFERENCEOFCOMMISSIONERS ONUNIFORMSTATELAWS ANDPROCEEDINGS OF
THEFORTY-FIRSTANNUALCONFERENCE 143-45 (1931).
93 LEWIS M. SIMES & PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING
AMODEL PROBATE CODE 20 (1946).
94 W.D. ROLLISON, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 25-26 (1st
ed. 1970).
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because it “offers . . . insurance against unwarranted [w]ill
contests.”95 Additionally, one commentator addressed the stated
disadvantage of publicity, believing that despite most people’s
preference to keep their will private, the availability of the
procedure should not depend on the majority’s sentiments.96
Ultimately, the Code included no mention of an antemortem
statute.97 Following the adoption of antemortem probate statutes
in three states in the late 1970s,98 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws once again considered
including antemortem probate in the UPC based on one of two
drafts.99 One of the contemplated drafts was shaped by the
Contest Model, and the other draft was based on the
Administrative Model,100 but in the end, the drafters were divided
on the project and chose to discontinue their efforts.101
States did not begin adopting antemortem probate until
1977, when North Dakota passed its antemortem statute,
followed by Ohio in 1978 and Arkansas in 1979.102 In 1994, the
Texas Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law Council looked into
drafting an antemortem probate statute because of its belief that
the procedure would be useful.103 The Council chose not to pursue
the project, however, because they determined that there were
items of more pressing concern.104 Since the 1970s, no state had
passed an antemortem probate law until Alaska in 2010.105 There
was discussion of antemortem probate in New York in 2009, but
the New York City Bar Committee on Trusts, Estates and
Surrogate’s Courts opposed such a statute in any form, whether
as “an actual probate proceeding, an action for declaratory
95 Id. at 26.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See infra Sections II.C.1-3; see also Leopold & Beyer, supra note 72, at 169.
99 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCEMEETING IN ITSNINETIETH YEAR 67 (1981);
see also Leopold & Beyer, supra note 72, at 175-80.
100 See infra Section II.B. The text of the two drafts considered by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has been reprinted in Leopold &
Beyer, supra note 72, at apps. E, F.
101 Leopold & Beyer, supra note 72, at 175, 180-81; see also Gerry W. Beyer,
Anticipating Will Contests and How to Avoid Them 31-32 (Sept. 20, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924906 [http://perma.cc/
4JVJ-DNRL].
102 See infra Sections II.C.1-3; see also Leopold & Beyer, supra note 72, at 169.
103 Beyer, supra note 101, at 32.
104 Id.
105 See infra Section II.C.4; see also Beyer, supra note 101, at 31.
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judgment that a will is valid, or any other type of proceeding.”106
In January 2014, the New Jersey Law Revision Commission
authorized a project, largely based on the publication of a law
journal article,107 to determine whether antemortem probate
would be appropriate for the state.108 The project staff has sought
input from New Jersey legal associations and practitioners to
assist in the determination and will eventually put together a
report discussing the measure.109 More recently, New Hampshire
passed an antemortem probate statute that was signed into law
in 2014, but it represents only one of two states to adopt such a
law since the 1970s.
B. Models
Over the years, three models have emerged for how an
antemortem statute should be written and implemented in order
to best combat the procedural hurdles that courts have identified.
The three models have been developed by Howard Fink, John H.
Langbein, and Gregory S. Alexander and Albert M. Pearson, and
they seek to protect testamentary freedom of disposition.
The Contest Model statute proposes an adversarial
proceeding for a declaratory judgment on testamentary mental
capacity, proper execution procedures, and undue influence.110
The interested parties who must be named in the proceeding
include the will beneficiaries and intestate beneficiaries.111 This
gives the interested parties the opportunity to contest the will
just as in a postmortem will contest, but this model instead
“changes only the timing of the litigation.”112 If the court
determines that the will is valid, it will be filed with the court
and deemed binding on all parties, and it can only be changed if
the testator repeats the procedure and obtains another
106 COMM. ON TRS., ESTATES AND SURROGATE’S COURTS, N.Y.C. BAR, COMMENT
ON PERMITTING PRE-MORTEM PROBATE IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 3 (2009),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Pre_Mortem_Probate.pdf [http://perma.cc/362K-95B9].
107 See Glenn R. Kazlow et al., Ante-Mortem Probate: Why Wait Until It’s Too
Late?, 214 N.J.L.J. 1051 (2013).
108 Memorandum from Jordan Goldberg to the N.J. Law Revision Comm’n 1-2
(Jan. 16, 2014) (on file with author); Memorandum from Susan G. Thatch to the N.J.
Law Revision Comm’n 1 (Nov. 10, 2014) (on file with author).
109 Memorandum from Susan G. Thatch, supra note 108. For more information
related to antemortem probate in New Jersey, see Susan G. Thatch, Ante-Mortem Probate
in New Jersey—An Idea Resurrected?, 39 SETONHALLLEGIS. J. 331 (2015).
110 Howard Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life
After Death?, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 275 (1976); Mary Louise Fellows, The Case Against
Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1073 (1980).
111 See Fink, supra note 110, at 275; Fellows, supra note 110, at 1073.
112 Fellows, supra note 110, at 1073.
796 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2
judgment.113 The five states that have adopted antemortem
legislation follow this model. The primary problem with this
model is that the will’s contents become public knowledge because
they must be disclosed in the proceeding.114 The other identifiable
problems are the adversarial nature of the proceeding, which can
create tension and strain familial relationships, as well as the
expense of the proceeding.115 The benefit this model provides is
finality—a judgment finding validity is binding on all parties
subject only to a subsequent judgment.116
The Conservatorship Model statute follows the adversarial
nature of the Contest Model, as the testator must petition the
court for a declaratory judgment on testamentary mental
capacity and undue influence, but it seeks to dissuade the family
conflict by appointing a guardian ad litem117 to represent the
interested parties who might be adversely affected by an
erroneous determination of validity.118 In this way, the guardian
ad litem can communicate information between the interested
parties and the testator.119 The guardian ad litem would not be
obligated to initiate a contest but rather would verify the
testator’s proof of capacity and the absence of undue influence or
fraud.120 In this capacity, the guardian ad litem has discovery
rights, including to request document production and depose
witnesses.121 Thus, the guardian ad litem’s role is to reduce the
strain on familial relationships, although at least one
commentator doubts the utility of this role because the testator
and others are likely to recognize the sources from which the
guardian ad litem has obtained information.122 This model also
suffers from the problem of disclosure because it causes a will’s
contents to become publicly available.123
113 Fink, supra note 110, at 275.
114 Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate—The Definitive Will Contest
Prevention Technique, 23 ACTECNOTES, 1997, at 83, 86, https://www.actec.org/resources/
publications/notes/PDFNotes/Notes-Summer97.pdf [http://perma.cc/QP49-LETR].
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 A “guardian” is “[s]omeone who has the legal authority and duty to care for
another’s person or property, esp[ecially] because of the other’s infancy, incapacity, or
disability.” Guardian, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A “guardian ad litem” is
“[a] guardian, usu[ally] a lawyer, appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf
of an incompetent or minor party.” Guardian Ad Litem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014).
118 John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 63, 77-78 (1978).
119 Id. at 78.
120 Id. at 79.
121 Id.
122 Fellows, supra note 110, at 1075.
123 Beyer, supra note 114, at 86.
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The Administrative Model takes a different approach. It
departs from the judicial and adversarial approaches of the
Contest Model and the Conservatorship Model. Instead of an
accelerated will contest, the Administrative Model proposes an
ex parte proceeding in which the state considers the testator’s
particular factual circumstances to determine the validity of a
will.124 This proposal puts forth a two-step process: (1) enact an
antemortem statute; and (2) revise the statutory preconditions
for contesting a will.125
As the first step in the Administrative Model, under an
enacted statute, a testator would petition the court to determine
whether the testator duly executed the will, had the requisite
capacity to execute the will, and was not under any undue
influence.126 Only the trier of fact, presumably a judge, would
have access to the will, and review would occur in camera127 to
preserve confidentiality.128 A guardian ad litem would be
appointed to serve as the court’s agent and conduct interviews
with the testator and interested parties, rather than to serve as a
fiduciary for the interested parties as in the Conservatorship
Model.129 The guardian ad litem would not be privy to the will’s
contents, although the trier might maintain discretion to disclose
the will’s contents to the guardian.130 In this way, the guardian
would be responsible for looking for signs of probable undue
influence or lack of capacity.131 This model does not require notice
to the interested parties based on the idea that expectant heirs do
not possess a constitutional right to notice.132 If the trier finds the
will valid, it may order a declaration of validity.133
The second step in the Administrative Model involves
amending the right-to-contest statutes, which create standing to
contest a will in postmortem probate proceedings. In order to
make the trier’s order conclusive, the right-to-contest statutes
would be amended to make an antemortem probate
determination binding in the postmortem phase so that an heir
could not challenge the will on the grounds of execution
124 Gregory S. Alexander & Albert M. Pearson, Alternative Methods of Ante-
Mortem Probate and Procedural Due Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 89, 112 (1979).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 “[I]n a judge’s chambers or other private place.” In Camera Proceeding,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
128 Alexander & Pearson, supra note 124, at 113.
129 Id. at 113-14.
130 Id. at 114.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 115.
133 Id. at 116.
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formalities, capacity, or undue influence; however, fraud would
remain a permissible claim postmortem.134 Although the
Administrative Model may still strain familial relationships in
the same way as the Conservatorship Model because of the
guardian ad litem,135 it is an innovative response to probate’s
disincentives and represents an effort to restore probate as a
reliable mode of wealth succession that preserves testamentary
freedom of disposition.
C. States with Antemortem Probate Statutes
Five states have recognized the potential benefits of
antemortem probate and have enacted legislation permitting it.
Each of the statutes, in line with the Contest Model, allows a
testator to petition a court to validate a will during the testator’s
life. Each statute, however, varies in the procedures it sets forth,
including who may initiate the procedure and the relevance of the
procedure if the will is later changed.
1. North Dakota
In accordance with North Dakota law, a testator who
executes a will disposing of an estate may commence a proceeding
to seek a declaratory judgment of the will’s validity.136 The
judgment may be made based on “the signature on the will, the
required number of witnesses to the signature and their
signatures, and the testamentary capacity and freedom from
undue influence of the person executing the will.”137 The testator
must name will beneficiaries and present intestate beneficiaries
to the proceeding;138 these parties are considered to have “inchoate
property rights.”139
If the court determines that the will is valid, it must be
placed on file with the court.140 The will is declared adjudicated
and is binding in North Dakota unless the testator executes a new
will.141 The facts in this proceeding are inadmissible as evidence in
any other proceeding that does not relate to the validity of the
will.142 In the case of a newly executed will, the testator must
134 Id. at 117-18.
135 Fellows, supra note 110, at 1077.
136 N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 (2015).
137 Id.
138 Id. § 30.1-08.1-02.
139 Id.
140 Id. § 30.1-08.1-03.
141 Id.
142 Id. § 30.1-08.1-04.
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commence a new proceeding for declaratory judgment to supersede
the prior will.143 As in the earlier proceeding, the testator must
name new beneficiaries as parties to the new proceeding, as well
as the beneficiaries from the old proceeding.144
The statute is seldom used, but in a survey of North
Dakota practitioners, 90% found that the antemortem probate
option enhances North Dakota’s probate practice because it
“prevents will contests, creates certainty of a will’s validity,
and permits the testator and witnesses to testify when their
memories are fresh.”145
2. Ohio
In accordance with Ohio law, a testator who executes a
will may request a proceeding for a declaratory judgment, and
the court will hold an adversarial hearing to determine the
will’s validity.146 The testator’s county of domicile determines
proper venue, or if the testator is not domiciled in the state,
then the venue is the county where the testator’s real property
is located.147 As in North Dakota, the testator must name the
will beneficiaries and intestate beneficiaries as parties to the
proceeding.148 A testator’s failure to file a validation proceeding
cannot serve as evidence of improper execution, lack of mental
capacity, or undue influence.149
The will is valid if after the hearing, the court finds that
the will was executed using proper procedures, the testator had
the required testamentary capacity, and there was no undue
influence.150 A declaration of validity is binding in Ohio and must
be sealed along with the will and filed with the court.151 The facts
in this proceeding are inadmissible as evidence in any other
proceeding that does not relate to the validity of the will.152 Only
the testator may have access to the filed will, and if the testator
removes the will from the court’s possession, the declaration of
validity is null and void.153 A testator may commence a new
143 Id. § 30.1-08.1-03.
144 Id.
145 Beyer, supra note 114, at 88.
146 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.081(A), 2107.083 (West 2015).
147 Id. § 2107.081(A).
148 Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-02 (2015).
149 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081(B).
150 Id. § 2107.084(A).
151 Id. § 2107.084(A), (B).
152 Id. § 2107.085.
153 Id. § 2107.084(B).
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proceeding and repeat the above-mentioned process to revoke or
modify the valid will.154
A survey of Ohio practitioners found that responding
practitioners generally felt that the antemortem probate
option was complicated, expensive, and created too much
unwanted conflict.155
3. Arkansas
Under Arkansas law, a testator can commence a
proceeding for a declaratory judgment in order to find a will valid,
but only if the will disposes of “all or part of an estate located in
Arkansas.”156 Proper venue is the county where the estate is
located.157 Like in North Dakota and Ohio, the testator must
name will beneficiaries and intestate beneficiaries as parties to
the proceeding,158 and these parties are deemed to possess
“inchoate property rights.”159
The will is valid if the court finds that the will was
properly executed, the testator had the required testamentary
capacity, and there was no undue influence.160 A valid will must
be filed with the court.161 A testator may modify or supersede the
valid will, but unlike in North Dakota and Ohio, the modified or
superseded will does not need to be validated via the above-
mentioned process.162
Results from a survey of Arkansas practitioners revealed
that more than half of the responding practitioners thought that
antemortem probate was not beneficial because it violates a
testator’s privacy, causes family disputes, and is an unnecessary
expense.163 On the other hand, more than one-third of
respondents thought the procedure was beneficial because it
prevents will contests, provides certainty, and gives the testator
a sense of comfort.164
154 Id. § 2107.084(C), (D).
155 Beyer, supra note 114, at 88.
156 ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202(a) (West 2014).
157 Id.
158 Id. § 28-40-202(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-02 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2107.081(A).
159 ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202(c).
160 Id. § 28-40-203(a).
161 Id.
162 Compare id. § 28-40-203(b), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-03, and
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.084(C), (D).
163 Beyer, supra note 114, at 89.
164 Id.
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4. Alaska
Under Alaska law, a testator, nominated personal
representative, or interested party (with the testator’s consent)
may petition the court for a determination that a will is valid.165
The testator’s county of domicile determines proper venue, or if
the testator is not domiciled in the state, then venue is in any
judicial district.166 Through this venue provision, Alaska might
be attempting to “market its legal benefits to nonresidents.”167
Among other requirements, the petition must contain
statements that a copy of the will is on file with the court; the will
is in writing; the testator signed the will with testamentary
intent, testamentary capacity, free will, without undue influence
or duress, and without fraud or mistake; the will has not been
modified or revoked; and the testator is familiar with the will’s
contents.168 The petition must also contain the testator’s name
and address, as well as the names, addresses, and ages (if minors)
for the following interested parties: testator’s spouse, testator’s
children, testator’s heirs, testator’s nominated personal
representative, and testator’s devisees under the will.169 Once the
petition is filed, the court will set a time and place for the hearing,
and the petitioner must notify the interested parties.170 The
petitioner carries the burden of proof as to the proper execution of
the will, and an opponent carries the burden of proof as to the
lack of capacity or intent, undue influence, duress, fraud, mistake,
or revocation.171
If the court finds the will valid and it is not modified or
revoked following the declaration, the will has “full legal effect
as the instrument of the disposition of the testator’s estate and
shall be admitted to probate” following the testator’s death.172
The declaration is binding on all people whether “known,
unknown, born, or not born.”173 The testator, however, has the
authority to subsequently modify or revoke the valid will.174
Additionally, the Alaska statute addresses confidentiality.
All records are confidential except for a notice of the petition’s
165 ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.530 (2015).
166 Id. § 13.12.540(a).
167 David L. Skidmore & Laura E. Morris, Before the Party’s Over: The Arguments
For and Against Pre-Death Will Contests, PROB. &PROP.,Mar.-Apr. 2013, at 50, 53.
168 ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.12.545(1)-(3), (6)-(9), (12), (13) (2015).
169 Id. § 13.12.545(10), (11).
170 Id. § 13.12.565(a), (b).
171 Id. § 13.12.570.
172 Id. § 13.12.555.
173 Id. § 13.12.560.
174 Id. § 13.12.575.
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filing, a summary of the formal proceedings, and a modification or
dispositional order, all of which are public.175 The confidential
records may be made available to selected persons as indicated in
the statute.176
5. New Hampshire
Under New Hampshire law, a testator may commence a
proceeding to determine a will’s validity if the testator is
domiciled in the state or owns real property within the state.177
Unlike in Alaska, a testator’s guardian, conservator, or attorney-
in-fact cannot initiate the petition on the testator’s behalf.178 The
following people are considered interested parties deemed to
possess “inchoate property rights”: testator’s spouse, testator’s
heirs as of the filing date, legatees and devisees under the will,
nominated executors, and a charitable organization, if named.179
Each interested party must receive notice, and the court may
order notice to other people.180
If the will is valid, it has “full legal effect . . . and . . . shall
be admitted to probate,” unless the will is modified or revoked
following the declaration.181 A testator’s failure to commence a
proceeding is inadmissible evidence of the will’s validity.182
D. Benefits and Drawbacks of Antemortem Probate Statutes
Utilizing antemortem probate may not be for everyone,
but it provides concerned testators with certain benefits that are
not available in most states under current probate procedures.
Despite the disadvantages, antemortem probate might be the best
route to protecting testators’ intent, and the benefits could
outweigh the apparent disadvantages, particularly for individuals
in nontraditional families who cannot rely on intestacy as a
disposition scheme.
1. Advantages
The majority of states follow the rule that a will’s validity
is determined in a probate proceeding after the testator’s death.
175 Id. § 13.12.585(a).
176 Id. § 13.12.585(b).
177 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(I) (2015).
178 Compare id., with ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.530.
179 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(III)-(IV).
180 Id. § 552:18(V).
181 Id. § 552:18(VII).
182 Id. § 552:18(IX).
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The typical issues in a postmortem will contest involve mental
capacity, undue influence, and fraud.183 Because the testator is no
longer available to attest to these claims, the evidence must
necessarily come from secondhand sources. This gives rise to the
“worst evidence rule of probate procedure whereby the best
witness is dead by the time the question is litigated.”184 In
antemortem probate, however, the testator could participate in
the will validation proceeding, thereby strengthening the quality
of the evidence.185 The testator could attest to mental capacity,
intent, and free will, or could even be medically evaluated.186
Additionally, antemortem validation would help ensure
that the testator’s wishes are followed after death. In the event
that the will is deemed invalid in an antemortem validation
proceeding, the testator has the ability to “cure the source of
the invalidity or take alternative testamentary measures.”187
These advantages help reinforce the freedom of disposition
principle that underscores succession laws.
2. Disadvantages
Opponents of antemortem probate typically advance
three arguments. First, the antemortem proceeding requires
disclosure of the will’s contents, and thus there is no
confidentiality. This disclosure may threaten family harmony
and could impair personal relationships.188 Additionally, upon
receiving notice of an antemortem proceeding, a potentially
interested party might not raise an objection in order to
prevent disharmony with the testator or to maintain an
inheritance under the will.189 Disclosing the contents, however,
could also provide potential heirs with valuable information to
compile claims against the will.
Second, antemortem probate is an unnecessary expense
that may end in fruitless litigation. Antemortem proceedings might
be required more than once in a testator’s lifetime because the
testator retains the right to modify or supersede the will.190 And
because the size of a testator’s estate can change, a testator might
183 Ryznar & Devaux, supra note 10, at 3.
184 Sitkoff, supra note 10, at 649; see also John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103
YALE L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994) (book review); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 10, at
265 (noting the worst evidence rule of probate procedure).
185 Skidmore & Morris, supra note 167, at 52.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Fellows, supra note 110, at 1073.
189 Id. at 1073-74.
190 Skidmore & Morris, supra note 167, at 55.
804 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2
end up leaving no property or insufficient property to justify the
proceeding.191 Finally, because the judgment can only bind parties
that were given proper notice, any defective notice permits a
postmortem contest, despite the antemortem proceeding.192
Third, not all states permit antemortem probate. Thus, it
is unclear what the legal effect would be for a will that is judged
valid in a state that recognizes the right if a testator subsequently
moves to a state that does not recognize the right.193
While these disadvantages should be considered, the
doctrine of antemortem probate is a workable solution that can
be molded to respond to some of these criticisms, as evidenced
by the varying models that legal scholars have proposed thus
far. What’s more, some of these drawbacks—mainly those
related to family disharmony and expense—should be reserved
for the consideration of the testator, who is best positioned to
assess those issues.
The following proposal responds to these criticisms and
demonstrates how the advantages are likely to outweigh the
stated disadvantages for individuals in nontraditional families.
III. A FRAMEWORK FORNO-NOTICE ANTEMORTEM PROBATE
American family life is complex and subject to individual
and special circumstances. After considering the various models
and the adversarial versions of antemortem probate that are
implemented in five states, the most significant problem relates to
disclosure and confidentiality. To address this problem, this note
proposes a modified antemortem probate proceeding based on the
Administrative Model that will protect confidentiality by not
requiring notice to all interested parties. The proposal still
contemplates the enactment of an antemortem statute but argues
for shifting the burden of proving a will’s validity to the testator
as a means of preventing disclosure. The proposal outlined here is
by no means the exclusive way to implement no-notice
antemortem probate, but it is optimal because it accommodates
both confidentiality and near certainty—two elements that make
antemortem probate an attractive solution.
The proposed statute retains many features of the five
state-enacted statutes, but it responds to the main criticism of
confidentiality by modifying the testator’s responsibilities in the
proceeding. Most notably, this proposal modifies the procedure for
191 Fellows, supra note 110, at 1073.
192 Skidmore & Morris, supra note 167, at 55.
193 Fellows, supra note 110, at 1082.
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an antemortem determination. The Contest and Conservatorship
Models and current statutes adopt a procedure that looks like an
accelerated will contest and involves formal notice requirements
and participatory rights. Instead, as in the Administrative Model,
the proposed statute outlines an ex parte proceeding194 where the
trier of fact must be satisfied with the factual circumstances of
the testator’s succession plan.
Under the proposed UPC statute, antemortem probate is
still initiated with a petition to the court for a declaration that the
testator duly executed the will, had the requisite capacity, and
was free from undue influence. The petition would also include
the will that the testator desires to certify so that the trier can
accurately make a validity determination based on the specific
testamentary disposition written in the will. This review would
occur in camera so as to protect the confidentiality of the will
document. Similar to the Alaska statute, only notice of the
petition’s filing, modification, or revocation would be available to
the public. The rest of the information pertaining to the
antemortem, ex parte proceeding would be confidential and privy
only to the testator, the testator’s attorney, the judge, and the
judge’s administrative staff, if necessary. Of course, the testator
retains the discretion to disclose the will’s contents to any other
person in whom she wishes to confide.
This confidential approach adopts the view that because
no one has heirs until death, potential heirs have no
constitutional right to notice. Until a testator’s death, a potential
heir maintains only a mere expectancy rather than a legally
ascertainable or pecuniary interest.195 The no-notice requirement
makes this proceeding ex parte, which is not wholly without
precedent. Ohio currently has a “designated heir” statute by
which any competent person (the designator) may appear before a
probate judge and file a written declaration designating and
appointing another person (the designee) as an heir at law in the
event of the designator’s death.196 If the judge is satisfied that the
designator is competent and free from restraint, he or she will
make a complete record of the proceeding, and a certified copy of
the record serves as conclusive evidence absent a showing of fraud
or undue influence.197 The Ohio Court of Appeals found this
statute constitutional and held that it does not deprive
194 An ex parte proceeding is initiated by only one party and does not require
notice to or argument from the adverse party. See Ex Parte Proceeding, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
195 Martone v. Martone, 509 S.E.2d 302, 305-06 (Va. 1999).
196 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (West 2015).
197 Id.
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prospective heirs of any right because they had no vested right in
the property at the time of the designation.198
Under this no-notice framework, the testator would have
the burden of proving proper execution, requisite capacity, and
freedom from undue influence. This evidence may include, but is
not limited to, a self-proved will, a videotaped execution
ceremony, a medical exam, or affidavits from advisors such as an
attorney, a physician, an accountant, or another professional
acquaintance who is in a position to attest to the testator’s mental
state or regular dealings. This places the burden of proof on the
testator to present all relevant evidence in order to obtain a
determination of validity. If the trier is satisfied with all the
evidence provided, he or she may order the will valid and
maintain the will on file.
Because this proceeding is ex parte, the determination is
not permanent, but that is not to say the proceeding is for naught.
The temporary nature of the ex parte determination fits with the
no-notice framework in that upon the testator’s death, an actual
heir is entitled to bring a contest postmortem. In essence, this
gives an heir constitutional due process. A trier’s determination of
validity antemortem serves as prima facie evidence of validity,
however, and creates a rebuttable presumption that the will is
valid. The contesting heir must rebut the presumption with clear
and convincing evidence that the will was not a product of proper
execution or capacity or that the will was a product of undue
influence or fraud. If the contester’s evidence is not sufficient to
surmount the testator’s previously provided evidence, then the ex
parte determination becomes permanently valid. This
presumption merely shifts the burden of proof at the appropriate
point in time. Thus, in addition to affording confidentiality, this
technique also provides an answer to “the worst evidence rule”
problem. A testator now has a voice in a postmortem contest via
the evidence provided during life, should such a contest be
permitted based on the newly furnished evidence.
Given that an individual has the right to revoke or modify
a will, the proposed statute still permits such an action. In the
case of modification, the testator will continue to bear the burden
of proof for the modified will that is to supersede the previously
validated will. This is in line with the statutes in place in North
Dakota, Ohio, Arkansas, and New Hampshire. In the case of
revocation, the testator must sign a statement that she no longer
198 Davis v. Laws, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 193, 208-09 (Ohio Ct. C.P. July 24,
1928), aff’d, 170 N.E. 601 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929).
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wishes for the will to be valid and file it with the court that issued
the original declaration.
Of course, there will be an expense related to any kind of
proceeding. One assumption of the proposed antemortem probate
solution is that testators who choose to exercise the antemortem
probate option do so because the presented will is intended as the
last will. Another assumption is that those testators who choose
to utilize the antemortem probate option do so because the
expense is less than the potential cost of full-blown postmortem
litigation that may be more likely for a nontraditional family
member. Additionally, the testator may find the expense
worthwhile for the comfort and security that antemortem probate
can provide given that the alternative of intestacy laws will likely
destroy the testator’s intended disposition scheme.
Unlike the statutes currently in effect, this proposed
statute does not provide for total incontestability. But it may
effectively prevent many potential contests that would otherwise
occur if an antemortem proceeding were not available, because the
determination creates a strong presumption of validity. Despite
falling short of incontestability, this solution allows confidentiality
to share center stage with near certainty. Notwithstanding its
potential flaws, the advantages of antemortem probate for
nontraditional family members cannot be overstated. Antemortem
probate will provide nontraditional families with an alternative to
the traditional postmortem probate process, which is currently
flawed in its failure to recognize the fast-evolving population of
nontraditional families. Thus, when nontraditional family
members execute a will, they necessarily opt out of intestacy, and
antemortem probate is one way to preserve their exercise of
freedom of disposition.
IV. PROPOSED ANTEMORTEM PROBATE STATUTE
The proposed statute set forth below for incorporation in
the UPC primarily combines features from the statutes enacted in
the five states that have antemortem probate and the
Administrative Model framework. The state statutes set a
foundation for many provisions, while the Administrative Model
helps incorporate the element of confidentiality into the procedure.
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Probate of Will Prior to Testator’s Death
Section 1. Petition for Order Declaring Validity of Will Before
Death199
A testator, during his or her lifetime, may petition the
court for an order declaring that the testator’s will has been
duly executed and is the testator’s valid will subject only to
subsequent revocation or modification. For purposes of this
petition, the testator must be domiciled in the state or own real
property located in the state.
Section 2. Venue200
If the testator is domiciled in the state, then the venue for
a petition under [statute] is the judicial district of this state where
the testator is domiciled. If the testator owns real property in the
state, then the venue for a petition under [statute] is the judicial
district of this state where the real property is located.
Section 3. Contents of Petition
a) A petition under [statute] must contain the following
statements:201
i. A statement that the testator executed the will in a
form valid under the laws of this state;
ii. A statement that the testator properly executed the will
with testamentary intent;
iii. A statement that the testator had testamentary
capacity at the time he or she executed the will;
iv. A statement that the testator executed the will through
an exercise of his or her free will and free from undue
influence or duress;
v. A statement that the execution of the will was not the
result of fraud or mistake; and
vi. A statement that the testator is familiar with the
contents of the will.
b) The original will shall be filed with the petition.
199 This section is based on N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(I) (2015).
200 This section is based on the three current state statutes that permit venue if
the testator is domiciled in the state or owns real property in the state, because a testator
should have a physical connection to the state. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202(a) (West
2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(II); OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 2107.081(A) (West 2015).
201 This section is based on ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.545 (2015).
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c) A testator may present evidence in the following forms but is not
limited to these forms:
i. Self-proved will;
ii. Videotaped execution;
iii. Medical exam;
iv. Affidavits;
v. The trier may require evidence from physicians,
psychologists, psychiatrists, and other persons of its own
choosing in order to properly examine the testator and his
or her specific factual circumstances.
Section 4. Hearing on Validity of Will202
When a petition is filed pursuant to this statute, the trier
shall conduct an ex parte hearing on the validity of the will. The
hearing shall be confidential in nature and shall be conducted in
camera. A testator has the burden of establishing prima facie
proof of the execution of the will, the requisite testamentary
capacity, and freedom from undue influence and fraud.
Section 5. Declaration of Validity203
The trier may declare a will valid and make other findings
of fact and conclusions of law that are appropriate under the
circumstances. The trier shall declare the will valid if, after
conducting a proper inspection of the will and related evidence
provided by the testator, the trier is satisfied that the testator
duly executed the will under the laws of this state in effect at the
time of execution, that the testator had the requisite testamentary
capacity, and that the testator was free from undue influence.
Section 6. Effect of Declaration
If a testator presents satisfactory evidence of execution,
capacity, and freedom from undue influence and fraud, then upon
death, unless a contester establishes to the contrary, the will shall
be presumed valid and given full legal effect for the purposes of
this statute. If a challenge arises, a contester can rebut the
presumption only by clear and convincing evidence.
202 This section is based on the first step of the Administrative Model, which
proposes an ex parte proceeding. See supra Section II.B.
203 This section is modeled after the five current state statutes. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.12.555; ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-203(a); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(VI); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-08.1-03 (2015); OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 2107.084(A).
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Section 7. Revocation204
A testator may withdraw a will declared valid and filed
with the court provided the testator signs a statement of
revocation to be written across the face of the will at the time of
withdrawal. A testator’s request to withdraw a will previously
declared valid must be made by verified application filed with the
court that originally declared the will to be valid. A testator may
modify a will declared to be valid with a subsequent will or codicil
only if the testator presents new evidence of execution, capacity,
and freedom from undue influence, in order to establish the
presumption of validity of the codicil or superseding will.
Section 8. Confidentiality205
a) A notice of the filing of a petition and a modification or revocation
shall be available for public inspection. Except as provided in
subsections (b) and (c) of this section, all other information related to the
ex parte proceeding is confidential.
b) The ex parte proceeding records may be made available to:
i. The testator;
ii. The testator’s attorney;
iii. The judge hearing or reviewing the matter; and
iv. A member of the clerical or administrative staff if access is
essential for authorized, internal administrative purposes.
c) For good cause shown, the judge may order the ex parte records
that are confidential under section 8(a) to be made available to a person
who is not listed in section 8(b).
Section 9. Effect of Failure to Petition for Declaration of Validity206
Failure of a testator to file a petition for a declaration of
the validity of the testator’s executed will shall not be construed
as evidence or an admission (i) that the will was not properly
executed, (ii) that the testator lacked requisite testamentary
capacity, or (iii) that the testator was subject to undue influence.
204 This section is based on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.084(D) and the
Administrative Model, which proposes that notice of revocation or modification be submitted
to the court. Alexander & Pearson, supra note 124, at 119. Also influential was a draft
considered by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the
early 1980s, which is reproduced in Leopold & Beyer, supra note 72, at app. E.
205 This section is based on ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.585.
206 This section is based on N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(IX) and OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2107.081(B).
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CONCLUSION
The structure of the American family has evolved and will
continue to transform. But what will not change is that we all
must face death. The current inheritance laws do not account for
and are not adapted to the dramatic change in the American
family in the past few decades. Family structures that include
unmarried cohabitating couples, same-sex couples, and blended
stepfamilies are now commonplace. For these nontraditional
families, functional relationships may be more important than
relationships created through blood or marriage. Given the
changing family structure, there are many benefits that a
nontraditional family member could realize through the use of
antemortem probate. So while wills serve as a workable way of
opting out of intestacy rules, the testator who chooses to prepare
for death through a will should be able to rest in peace knowing
that a carefully crafted plan is faithfully upheld and executed.
Antemortem probate is merely one possible solution to the glaring
gap in the current inheritance law. An antemortem probate
statute in the UPC would help to preserve the commitment to
testamentary freedom of disposition embedded in inheritance law
and protect a nontraditional family member’s right to control the
disposition of property at death without worry that this exercise
might later be undone by a spurious will contest.
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